Anne M. Treisman
Work on attention raises problems of definition and of the interpretation and choice of experimental procedures. This review attempts to outline a coherent classification for attention tasks and to relate common experimental procedures to it. Discussion is restricted to tasks requiring immediate perception and response, in which subjects (Ss) are presented with more information than they can handle. It will not consider the role of attention in memory, discrimination learning, vigilance, or habituation, nor its relations with arousal or motivation. Even within this restricted area, a large variety of di¤erent experiments have been designed to throw light on the mechanisms of selective attention often with the assumption that all these tasks converged on a single, unitary process. How far is this assumption of a single mechanism justified?
In 1958 Broadbent summarized a large area of research and attempted to provide a unified explanation in his ''filter'' theory of selective attention. He assumed that, when several messages reach the senses, they are initially processed in parallel, but must at some central stage converge on a perceptual or decision channel of limited capacity. To reduce the load on this ''p'' system, a selective filter blocks irrelevant messages before they reach the bottleneck. Thus only a limited number of signals can be identified, stored in long-term memory or used to control behavior in any short period. Broadbent assumed that the information content, defined as bits per second, would be critical in determining how many stimuli could be perceived and he gave considerable evidence supporting this conclusion (e.g., Broadbent 1956, Webster and Thomson 1954) . This model has proved very fruitful in stimulating further ideas and experiments. We may now, 11 years later, ask what changes or amplifications have become necessary.
Here are two examples of results which are not immediately explained by Broadbent's model.
(a) If two passages of prose are presented at normal speed, one to each ear, Ss are able to follow only one of the two (Cherry 1953) . But if a single passage is given at twice the normal rate, it is almost as intelligible as before (Fairbanks, Guttman, and Miron 1957) . Similarly if the information content of the passage is doubled by using a low-order approximation to English (Moray and Taylor 1958, Treisman 1965a) , Ss achieve shadowing scores considerably higher than 50% of their original performance. The limit here seems to lie not in the overall information rate as such, but either in the number of physically separate inputs we can handle or in the number of separate sequences of interdependent items we can follow. (b) When Ss are asked to repeat back one of two dichotic auditory messages, the other produces negligible interference (Cherry 1953) . But if they are asked to name the colors of printed words which themselves name other colors, they find it extremely di‰cult to attend selectively to the colors and the words cause severe interference (Stroop 1935) . While Broadbent achieved an impressive and large-scale synthesis of a variety of di¤erent results by showing the features they had in common, we may now need to draw some logical distinctions between attention tasks and discuss their implications for explanatory models of attention.
A General Model of Perception
Attention can be defined as the selective aspect of perception and response. Any theory about attention therefore presupposes some general framework of ideas on the nature of the perceptual system. How can we best characterize the mechanisms converting physical stimuli, described objectively in terms like intensity, frequency, or wavelength, into the sights and sounds we experience? Like physical stimuli, our percepts appear to vary along a number of independent dimensions, such as color, size, and loudness, although these are not usually perfectly correlated with single physical dimensions (e.g., the wavelengths of light which alone are seen as red and green, in combination are seen as yellow). A plausible theory is that there are a number of di¤erent perceptual ''analyzers,'' each of which provides a set of mutually exclusive descriptions for a stimulus (Sutherland 1959) . For example, a given area cannot have more than one of the range of alternative colors, but it can also have values on the dimensions of size, brightness, and shape. Judgments about the di¤erent dimensions, although not fully additive in the information transmitted, appear to be made independently with little or no interaction (Beebe-Center, Rogers, and O'Connell 1955 , Garner 1962 , Pollack and Ficks 1954 . These independent perceptual dimensions suggest the existence of separate analyzers.
However, the operation of independent analyzers giving one output for each value on single dimensions would not su‰ce to explain the perception of complex or multidimensional patterns, like letters, faces, or spoken words. Different shapes may be composed of common elements, such as curves, straight lines, and intersections, di¤ering only in the way they are combined. One shape may constitute part of another; for example, ''P'' is contained in ''R.'' In such cases the perceptual system might operate by detecting conjunctions of particular criterial attributes. Computer programs using this principle have been developed for the task of character recognition (e.g., Selfridge and Neisser 1960, Uhr 1963 ). Perception of shape may thus depend on two or more levels of analyzers, those at a higher level grouping and classifying the outputs of those at a lower level to give another mutually exclusive set of complex percepts, such as the letters of the alphabet or the words of the English language. Although the outputs of any single analyzer at one level may be mutually exclusive (a curved line cannot also be straight), the outputs of di¤erent analyzers at one level could join in a variety of di¤erent combinations as inputs to the next level, in a way that is not possible within a simpler dimension like color.
The di¤erent perceptual analyzers may be arranged in series, in parallel, or in a hierarchy, but one assumes that the outputs of analyzers at any level, or any combination of outputs, may potentially be both stored in memory and used to control the overt response. It may also be possible at any stage to store not only the outputs but also the inputs to later analyzers, that is, to store for a short time in sensory form the data for subsequent analysis. Thus a single external ''stimulus'' may be held in two forms at once: (a) the results of analysis already made and (b) the sensory data for further analysis. We may already know that a particular sound was a word whispered by John and also retain a sensory ''tape recording'' which could allow us then to decide that the word was ''Good-bye.'' This raises the question how the outputs of analyzers are recombined and in particular how they are correctly related to a common source or to different sources. For example, how does one know that it is the ''H'' that is large and red while the ''G'' is small and black and not some other combination? One suggestion is that the sensory inputs are labeled by the results of some early stage of analysis, for example, with their spatial location or their time of occurrence, and retain this label throughout analysis.
Although there may be some di‰culty in determining empirically just what constitutes an independent analyzer for any particular organism, this conceptual framework may be useful in exploring some functional distinctions between di¤erent types of selective attention.
A Classification of Attention Tasks
An example of a complex visual search task may help to illustrate some di¤erent strategies or models for selective attention. We might ask S to decide whether a display of colored letters in di¤erent sizes and orientations contains the letter ''G'' or not. To do this he must first direct his attention to the display and not elsewhere in the room, that is, he must select the class of sensory data coming from one particular area as the input to the perceptual system. Second, he must attend to the shapes of the letters and not their colors, sizes, or orientations, that is, he must select the analyzers for shape and reject those for color, and so on. Next he must identify the target letter ''G'' if it is present, and if possible ignore di¤erences between the other letters. To do this he may be able to modify the function of the shape analyzers so that they perform only the subset of tests for those critical features necessary to identify ''G.'' He would therefore distinguish among the other letters only those which also di¤ered by one or more of the critical features in ''G.'' Finally, he must select the appropriate output of the shape analyzers to control the response, ''G,'' giving a positive response and all other outputs a negative one.
In another form of the experiment S might be told that the target letter ''G'' will be red if it is present at all. This might enable him further to restrict the inputs to the shape analyzers by selecting only red items for analysis. To do this, of course, he would have to use the color analyzer at some earlier stage to distinguish red items from others, but he could still reject analyzers for size and orientation, and perhaps also reject tests for colors other than red and so ignore the di¤erences between green and black letters. With this extra cue for input selection, Smith (1962) found that search was much more e‰cient.
This example shows that four functionally di¤erent types of selection could play a role in determining attention, one a¤ecting only response and memory and the other three restricting perception. (a) We could select which outputs of the perceptual analyzers are stored and used to control our responses; (b) we could select which inputs (which set of sensory data) to send to the analyzers; (c) we could select which analyzers to use; (d) we could select within the analyzers which tests to make or which target values to identify (red as opposed to green or black, ''G'' as opposed to ''H'' or ''N'') . These four types of attention shall be called (a) output selection, (b) input selection, (c) analyzer selection, and (d) test or target selection; the next section describes them in more detail.
Selection of Outputs
This model of attention assumes full analysis of all inputs by all analyzers and matches selected outputs to the appropriate actions. It assumes that there is some limit to the responses we can make and to the information we can store, and that simultaneous outputs of perceptual analysis compete for access to the limited capacity motor systems and memory. Competition might be between the outputs of di¤erent analyzers given the same input or between outputs of a single analyzer given di¤erent inputs. Deutsch (1963, 1967) and Reynolds (1964) have made the strong claim that all attention tasks can be explained simply in terms of selection of outputs with no restrictions at all on perceptual processing.
Selection of Inputs or Sets of Sensory Data for Analysis
This type of attention restricts perception by selecting which set of sensory data to analyze. The selected set could logically (though perhaps not in practice) be labeled by any property which has been analyzed at some earlier stage of perceptual processing, whether this property is as simple as the receptor stimulated (visual vs. auditory stimuli) or the spatial position (top vs. bottom of the page), or as complex as voice quality (John's voice vs. Peter's) or language (English vs. French) . This type of attention necessarily implies at least two successive stages of analysis, so that the decision taken by the first analyzer can be used to label the sensory data wanted for analysis by the second analyzer. The selected set of sensory data might also be defined by a combination of outputs from earlier analyzers; for example, we might want to read the words written in large red letters only, ignoring the small red and large black letters. This type of attention defines the data we look at and listen to, and not the properties we look or listen for. It is analogous to Broadbent's attention to particular ''channels'' of information and is the type of attention to which his ''filter'' theory seems best to apply.
Selection of Analyzers
With this type of attention we select one or more dimensions or properties of stimuli to analyze and ignore other dimensions or properties. It specifies the complete set of mutually exclusive values between which we will discriminate, leaving other sets unanalyzed. This form of selection has been studied primarily in the context of discrimination learning, for example, by Sutherland (1959 Sutherland ( , 1960 , Mackintosh (1965), and Zeaman and House (1963) . However, since these experiments have been concerned with the e¤ects of attention on learning rather than on immediate perception and response, they will not be further discussed in this paper. An example of an experiment measuring immediate responses rather than learning is the Stroop test, described earlier, in which Ss are required to select the analyzer for color and reject those used in reading words.
Selection of Tests and Targets
With this type of attention we select particular targets or goals of perceptual analysis, particular items we wish to identify, where the items are defined by one or a specified set of critical features. Each of these critical features would constitute one value on a dimension identified by some particular analyzer. The target items might be defined in very general terms, for example, ''human speech'' as opposed to ''bird song'' or ''tra‰c noise,'' or much more specifically, for example, ''John's voice saying good-bye.'' The target items might be detected by one analyzer only (e.g., the color red) or by several (e.g., ''a large red H''). Test selection di¤ers from analyzer selection in that it specifies the desired end result of analysis, while analyzer selection specifies only the set of possible end results between which we will discriminate. It di¤ers from input selection in that it selects a specific test or subset of tests to be made, while input selection selects one set of sensory data to analyze, using the results of an earlier test or set of tests to label the selected class. With both test and input selection ''John's voice'' may be the object of attention, but in di¤erent senses of the word: while test selection allows us to listen for John's voice (to see if he is speaking rather than Peter), input selection allows us to listen to John's voice (to see what he is saying or how loudly he is speaking, and to ignore what Peter is saying or how loudly). Figure 14 .1 shows two examples of tasks illustrating these four di¤erent types of attention; the first is the visual search task discussed earlier and the second is part of a selective listening task investigated by Lawson (1966) . The crosshatched areas do not necessarily imply positive inhibitory blocks to prevent analysis, but simply show which data are not further analyzed or which analyses and tests are not carried out. The actual mechanisms of selection are not discussed in this paper.
Some Experimental Tests of These Models

Selection of Outputs
Is response competition a su‰cient explanation for attention limits in all cases? Since there is little point in examining the perceptual strategies, if all the findings can be explained by this mechanism alone, it seems important to test it first. In a recent experiment, Treisman and Geffen (1967) tried to equate response competition for the two messages in a selective listening task. The Ss were given the primary task of attending to and repeating back the message reaching one ear. They were also asked to make the same manual tapping response whenever they heard a particular target word in either ear. Any asymmetry in the number of tapping responses to the ''attended'' and ''unattended'' message and in the interference these caused with shadowing would therefore indicate a perceptual rather than a response limit. On the other hand, any interference between tapping to and repeating back the target words in the ''attended'' message would show the e¤ects of response competition. The result clearly indicated a perceptual limit (87% taps to target words in the ''attended'' message and only 8% to those in the ''unattended'' message). The degree of response competition between tapping to and repeating back the same ''attended'' target words was much less marked: of those words that received one correct response (and so had been correctly perceived) only 9% failed to elicit the other.
Another form of perceptual selection was shown by LaBerge and Tweedy (1964) and LaBerge, Tweedy, and Ricker (1967) . They demonstrated that expectancy and motivation can both bias perception as well as response, by showing a decrease in the latency of an identical response to the more frequent or valued of two colors in a choice reaction-time task.
These experiments (among others) demonstrate that selective attention can a¤ect perception, not, of course, that response competition is always unimportant. In experiments on discrimination learning and on habituation, where the decision time is less limited, selection for response or memory may well play the major role. But it seems clear that there are also perceptual limits restricting the amount of attention which simultaneous stimuli can receive. The remainder of the paper will discuss the relative importance and e‰ciency of the three types of perceptual attention.
An Important Experimental Variable: Division versus Focusing of Attention
There are two distinct procedures we can adopt in examining the role of attention in perception. The S can either divide his attention between two or more stimuli, or select one and focus his attention on it, rejecting the others. With divided attention tasks we investigate how necessary a selective system is. How far can we e‰ciently (a) handle two or more sensory inputs, (b) use two analyzers, or (c) test for two targets in parallel? In which type of task is the brain more vulnerable to overloading, forcing restrictions on our attention despite instructions to divide it? With focused attention tasks, on the other hand, we ask how e‰ciently we can select or focus on (a) a single sensory input, (b) a single analyzer, or (c) a single target, when the task requires us to ignore competing inputs, dimensions, or targets? Which is more e‰cient at rejecting irrelevant material-input-selective, analyzer-selective, or test-selective attention? Table 14 .1 summarizes and illustrates how the distinction between division and focusing applies to the three types of attention. Notice that these forms of attention can be combined in di¤erent ways for particular tasks: for example, the com- Analyzer and test selection could be combined in the double task 2 F 3 F , for example, by asking Ss to respond both to variations in the loudness of the items and to the word ''eight.'' The response in input selection is made to some feature other than that defining the relevant input; in analyzer and test selection it is made to the dimension or targets specified in the table.
Notice also that there is no implication in these logical distinctions of any fixed hierarchy of analyzers or selective systems. Any of these strategies could be used at any level of analysis. The question of how far the order of perceptual processes and selective systems is fixed or variable is an empirical one, which should be decided experimentally, for example, by seeing which types of analysis can be made conditional on others, so giving economies of time or increased e‰ciency. We are here making logical distinctions between strategies, without prejudice to the levels of analysis at which they are usually applied.
Divided Attention
How far, then, can we (a) attend in parallel to two inputs, (b) use two analyzers at once, and (c) test for two targets at once? It has been argued against the existence of a perceptual limit that, since we possess the necessary analyzing systems anyway, no economy can be achieved by leaving some unused. This might be true of analyzer selection, but it does not apply to input selection in which a single analyzer receives inputs from two or more physical sources or to target selection where the targets may involve overlapping sets of tests within one analyzer. Perhaps then attention tasks might show more perceptual interference when competition is between inputs or targets than when it is between di¤erent analyzers discriminating along dimensions which vary independently. It seems likely also, that the parallel use of several analyzers is biologically the most useful form of divided attention, since we typically need to recognize and respond to objects defined by values along a number of dimensions. Selective attention to inputs or targets often requires divided attention to di¤erent analyzers and tests.
Two di¤erent measures have been used to investigate how far perceptual processing can be done in parallel with divided attention, or must be done serially, requiring focused attention. The first measures accuracy and the second latency. The first method compares the accuracy of responses in tasks requiring attention to two inputs, dimensions, or targets with those requiring attention only to one. The second method measures di¤erences in reaction time resulting from di¤erent numbers of inputs, dimensions, or targets to be matched or identified. A comprehensive review of all the evidence so far available shall not be attempted, but as examples some experiments shall be given which illustrate certain important points under each heading.
Tests Measuring Accuracy with Divided Attention Competing Inputs
This is the main method which has been used in the growing body of research on selective listening. The experiments by Cherry (1953) , by Treisman and Ge¤en (1967) described earlier, and by Moray (1959) have shown that division of attention between two auditory inputs to the speech analyzers is very limited. The Ss are able to recall or respond to very little of the verbal content of a secondary message when attending to and repeating back a primary message. When asked explicitly to divide their attention between two strings of auditory digits to detect some let-ters embedded in them, Ss did considerably less well on either input than when they focused their attention on one of the two (Moray and O'Brien 1967) . In particular when two target letters occurred simultaneously, Ss succeeded in detecting both on only 17% of occasions.
When the two eyes receive di¤erent inputs, binocular rivalry usually results, which may be taken as one limit on divided attention. However, unlike selection between dichotic auditory inputs, the choice is not normally under voluntary control, and division of attention in vision is usually tested with inputs di¤ering in spatial location. Webster and Haslerud (1964) showed a decrement in detection of the same peripheral lights when Ss were asked at the same time to count either foveal flashes or clicks. Most other visual experiments have used the tachistoscopic technique of single brief exposures. The span of apprehension, which is typically only four or five items, was taken to reflect the limits of divided attention with a single brief display. However, Sperling's (1963) experiments showing increases in letters detected (from 1 to 4) when a masking field was introduced at di¤erent intervals after the display, and Kinsbourne's (1968) experiment, showing changes in the latency of the subitizing response with di¤erent numbers of items, suggest that even below the span, items may be handled serially rather than in parallel, that is, that in these tasks attention may in fact not be divided but rather rapidly shifted.
There has been little investigation of divided attention to two continuous strings of visual items presented sequentially in two di¤erent positions, (which would be a closer parallel to the auditory experiments). In an unpublished pilot experiment, Treisman and Birch compared monitoring performance with two inputs when these were both auditory, both visual, or one auditory and one visual. With equal presentation rates, the visual-visual condition was considerably more e‰cient than the auditory-auditory, but it too revealed marked limits to the ability to divide attention when the target for which Ss were set was any sequence of two consecutive digits (for example ''23'' or ''78'') rather than a single digit. Under these conditions accuracy was only 28%. The Ss did appreciably better when dividing their attention between a visual and an auditory list, although they still got only 44% correct. While two inputs to the same modality must share the same analyzers throughout, the two inputs to di¤erent modalities would be at least partly analyzed by independent systems.
This last result raises a point which may be of some importance. Most experiments so far have tested the accuracy of divided attention between two inputs to the same set of analyzers, while also forcing S to distinguish between the inputs (e.g., making him shadow one of the two). They have therefore not determined whether the di‰culty arises in the shared use of one set of analyzers for two simultaneous sets of tests, or whether it comes in handling two inputs at once, taking them in and labeling them correctly by some preliminary analysis. One way around this would be to ask for the same response to both inputs, so that S need not first distinguish and label them. One could then compare three different conditions: (a) two inputs to a single analyzer (e.g., monitor two auditory strings of digits for one verbal target); (b) two inputs to two di¤erent analyzers (e.g., monitor one auditory string for a verbal target and another for a change of loudness or position); (c) one input to two analyzers (e.g., monitor a single auditory string for both a verbal target and a change of loudness) in all cases using the same single positive response.
Comparison of Accuracy with Inputs and Analyzers in Divided Attention
Although these tests have not been tried in exactly this form, two experiments suggest that the main limit is set by the double use of a single analyzer (Condition (a) is harder than Condition (b)), but that handling two inputs may also cause some di‰culty (Condition (b) is harder than Condition (c)). Treisman and Riley (1969) asked Ss to repeat a string of digits heard in one ear while listening to either ear for a letter, which was sometimes in the same voice as the digits and sometimes in a di¤erent voice. The Ss were therefore carrying out Task (a) when the target letter was in the same voice on the nonshadowed ear, Task (b) when it was in the di¤erent voice on the nonshadowed ear, and Task (c) when it was in the di¤erent voice on the shadowed ear. They detected virtually all targets in Conditions (b) and (c) and this monitoring produced no interference with the shadowing task. Thus a simple change of speaker can be detected in parallel with analysis of verbal content either of the same input or of a di¤erent input. On the other hand, the target letters in the same voice (which could only be distinguished by analysis of their verbal content) were detected much less often in the nonshadowed message (Task (a)), suggesting that the main di‰culty arises in the shared use of a single analyzer for two inputs.
However, the two tasks also di¤ered in complexity: discrimination of speakers was between only two voices, while the verbal targets had to be distinguished from 10 other words (the digits). In one condition of a similar experiment by Lawson (1966) , Ss were asked to make a discriminative response to one of two possible tones embedded in a shadowed and a nonshadowed message; their performance was worse than with a single tone and now showed a greater decrement on the nonrepeated message. Thus although handling two inputs is easier when they are sent to di¤erent analyzers, (tones or voices vs. words), it may also be harder to use these di¤erent analyzers on two di¤erent inputs than on the same input, at least when the two inputs must be distinguished from each other. At least part of the overloading in divided attention tasks may therefore be due to the reception and labeling of inputs from two di¤erent sources, as well as to the double use of a single analyzer.
An experiment by LaBerge and Winokur (1965) confirms the relative ease of dividing attention between two analyzers with one input. The Ss were asked to name the colors in which digits were printed and at the same time to note and recall a letter which was embedded at some variable point in the lists. They therefore had two dimensions, color and shape, to analyze for the same physical inputs, and a complex discrimination to make in the monitoring task. With a single target letter in the last list position they found 100% recall; with consonant digrams or trigrams they found about 85% recall, but this was probably a failure of memory rather than perception, since the first consonant of the trigram also received 100% recall at the zero delay.
Another recent experiment in vision directly compares these three attention tasks. Lappin (1967) compared report of tachistoscopically presented circles varying in size, color, and angle of line through the center, when Ss were asked to report the three dimensions of one item, one dimension of three items, or a di¤erent dimension of three di¤erent items. The particular stimuli and the responses made were directly comparable, since the experimental conditions changed only the relations between them. The first condition was easiest and the last slightly harder than the second. In the present framework, the first required the use of three analyzers on one input, the second the use of one analyzer on three inputs, and the third the use of three analyzers on three di¤erent inputs. Division of attention between di¤erent inputs was again the main source of di‰culty, and limits on the use of di¤erent analyzers only appeared when they were used for di¤erent inputs which S had to distinguish by their spatial location. Lappin also found that the responses to the three dimensions were essentially uncorrelated and independent, which would support the suggestion of parallel analysis. However, he found a large serial order e¤ect on response accuracy, when the di¤erent dimensions belonged to different input items, the third dimension being worst reported and the first best. Lappin felt this cast doubt on the parallel-processing model.
With a single input, however, there was no decrease in accuracy from first to third dimension. The results could therefore be explained on the assumption of parallel processing by di¤erent analyzers, combined with serial intake of di¤er-ent inputs and serial processing of these inputs within any one analyzer, the rate varying with the analyzer (as shown by the di¤erent slopes of the serial order curves). The rate of serial intake did not appear to vary with spatial separation of the inputs. It may reflect the time taken to select and label the appropriate subset of inputs for analysis, rather than a spatial scan or shift of attention.
Another test of these suggestions might be to compare the use of two input modalities with one in the presentation of verbal material. It seems plausible to suppose that there is some central stage of analysis for verbal material which is shared between words presented auditorily and visually-the stage at which the syntax and meaning are identified-as well as a stage which is not shared, at which the words are identified through analysis of the visual or the auditory patterns of stimulation. Informal ''experiments'' in reading aloud to children suggest that it is perfectly possible to read aloud accurately (or to the children's satisfaction) while listening to another conversation, provided one ignores the meaning of the story one is reading. The same does not seem to be true when one repeats back one auditory message while attempting to listen to another. Thus two-input tasks using two analyzers seem easy, while twoinput tasks with one analyzer are not. If this hypothesis is correct, one should be able to find tasks using identical inputs which in one case involve the use of the same central analyzer as well as the separate visual and auditory word analyzers, and in the other case only the use of separate modality-specific analyzers. For example, the monitoring task used by Treisman and Birch in one condition required S to detect a single target digit presented either visually or auditorily and in the other to detect an ascending sequence of two digits. The first might allow the S to bypass the shared central analyzers for symbolic information and to monitor in parallel for the specific patterns of sound and sight, while the second, which involved a symbolic aspect of the targets, would require analysis of both inputs by the central analyzer for meaning and so might prevent divided attention to vision and hearing. On the other hand, two inputs in the same modality would share not only the same central or symbolic analyzers but also the modalityspecific pattern analyzers and so might rule out divided attention even in the nonsymbolic task. The results of the preliminary study were inconclusive because the particular display used for the visual stimuli made the visual-visual monitoring for the specific target too easy compared to the auditory-auditory. The problem is being explored further.
Accuracy of Divided Attention to Competing Targets
Rather more clear-cut limits to the division of attention have been shown in tasks requiring the identification of varied numbers of targets, where the targets are detected by overlapping sets of tests within the same group of analyzers. Treisman and Ge¤en (1967), for example, showed that accuracy of monitoring in a selective listening task decreased as the range of targets increased. The Ss detected fewer targets in both shadowed and nonshadowed passages when these were defined as ''any digit'' or ''any color'' than when they were defined as specific single words like ''night'' or ''hot.'' A rather di¤erent type of evidence for serial operation of di¤erent perceptual tests comes from ambiguous stimuli, such as auditory homophones or visual figures like the Necker cube. With these stimuli it is not usually possible to be aware of both versions at once; perception appears to alternate or to select one dominant version of the word or picture. In binocular rivalry, Treisman (1962) showed that suppression of one input takes place only within analyzers for the property on which they di¤er. Information about position and shape from both eyes could be used to give stereoscopic depth for stimuli whose colors were rivaling, so that only one color was visible at a time.
Most other tasks varying the number of targets attended to have used the latency measure and will be discussed later.
Tests Assessing Divided Attention by Response Latencies
Measures of reaction time have been used to study whether analysis of two or more stimuli or properties is carried out in series or in parallel. If the analysis can be shown to be serial, this implies that attention cannot be divided between the items analyzed serially. On the other hand, e‰cient division of attention cannot be inferred directly from parallel analysis, since it is possible for parallel processes to interfere with one another. One might then say that division of attention was possible but ine‰cient. One indication of serial processing is a linear increase in reaction time with the number of items analyzed. Parallel analysis without interference might also result in increased latencies as the number of items increases if there is some variance in the processing time for these items, but there would be a nonlinear upper bound on the increase to be expected in this case (see Sternberg 1966) . Interference between parallel processes would further increase response latencies. Thus, if one found a linear or a marked and steep e¤ect of number of items on latency of response, one could conclude that division of attention was either impossible (serial processing) or ine‰cient (parallel processing with interference).
Latency and Number of Inputs
Probably the clearest example of this type of task is one by Sternberg (1967) , in which Ss were asked to search through a visual display of varying size for a particular target letter. The reaction time increased linearly with the number of items in the display, strongly suggesting that visual items in di¤erent spatial locations must be identified serially. A further experiment also suggesting that di¤erent inputs are handled serially is one by Davis (1964) , in which Ss made a same/di¤erent judgment about two visual stimuli presented successively with a varying interstimulus interval. When the interval was short, the repsonse was delayed, as though Ss could identify the second stimulus only after completing analysis of the first. Thus serial perception of inputs may be involved in the so-called psychological refractory period. Experiments by Kristo¤erson (1967) on judgments of successiveness similarly suggest some minimum time for identifying one stimulus before another stimulus can be accepted by the perceptual system.
Latency and Number of Analyzers
The evidence from reaction times for serial processing of di¤erent perceptual dimensions is more equivocal. Egeth (1966) compared latencies when Ss matched stimuli on one, two, or three dimensions (shape, color, and tilt) and found that the time to respond ''di¤erent'' decreased with the number of dimensions which were different and increased with the number which were relevant (when the number which were di¤erent was constant). However, the time to respond ''same'' did not increase monotonically with the number of relevant dimensions, as the serial model would predict. Nickerson (1966) did a similar experiment, using a classification rather than a matching task, and also got equivocal results. One possible factor a¤ecting the results in both cases is that focused attention may not be possible, so that some analyses are carried out automatically whether they are relevant to the task or not. The irrelevant decisions then might interfere with the response and have to be suppressed. Another point is that latencies might be determined not only by the number of decisions to be taken but also by the process of evaluating the relevance of these decisions to the response. For example, where a match on any one of three dimensions is required, Ss might be slower in deciding to say ''yes'' if they have also detected a mismatch on one or more other dimensions.
Latency and Number of Targets
Many experiments have shown that choice reaction time to single stimuli increases with the number of possible alternatives (Bricker 1955 , Hick 1952 ) unless the stimulus-response connection is highly compatible (Leonard 1959) or highly overlearned (Davis, Moray, and Treisman 1961, Mowbray and Rhoades 1959) . This suggests a change from some form of serial search (perhaps the sequential binary decisions implied by the optimal coding of information theory) or from a parallel analysis where the overall capacity is limited and shared between the di¤erent stimulus-response channels, to a truly independent testing in parallel once the stimulus-response connections have grown very familiar.
Parallel testing for practiced and familiar targets was also suggested by experiments on visual search by Neisser (1964) . His Ss searched for varying numbers of target letters in lines of printed letters; while the search time increased with the number of items per line to be looked at (i.e., the number of inputs) it did not increase with the number of items looked for (between one and 10 targets), with highly practiced Ss. However, he allowed high error rates, which may have changed the nature of the task to some extent. Very similar experiments Carvellas 1965, Kaplan, Carvellas, and Metlay 1966) have shown serial rather than parallel functioning. Neisser's task also showed an e¤ect of the number of targets when Ss were asked to search for their absence (''which line has no Q or H'') as if they had to check the presence of each of the set of targets serially, while in the earlier tasks their absence could be noted in parallel for the whole set. Sternberg (1967) found strong evidence for serial search through a set of memorized targets. He measured reaction times to match one or more visual digits with a varying number of memorized digits, and found that the response latency increased linearly with the number of comparisons to be made, suggesting that looking for and looking at an additional target letter required equal processing capacity. Of course this equivalence between targets and inputs might hold only where the task requires an equally detailed analysis of items looked for and at. Some search tasks might allow only partial analysis of nontarget items in the display, using a subset of the critical features which normally define them: for example, Ss searching for a ''Z'' in a context of curved letters and ''As'' might discard the curved letters in the display on the basis of a single property (curvature), while fully indentifying the target ''Z'' and the nontarget ''A.'' In this case, increasing the set of items looked for to include ''A'' as well as ''Z'' might actually reduce the perceptual load and the response time. As Rabbitt (1964) has pointed out, the range of features to be extracted or tests to be made may be more important than the range of letters.
In summary then, there is quite strong evidence that true division of attention is di‰cult or impossible and serial processing necessary, both with two or more inputs and with tests for two or more targets (unless these are highly familiar and practiced), while divided attention to di¤erent dimensions seems more e‰cient and serial processing in reaction-time tasks more dubious, at least with some of the dimensions so far tested.
Experimental Tests of Focused Attention
The second way of comparing these three forms of perceptual attention is to look at the relative e‰ciency of tasks which require attention to be focused on a single input, dimension, or set of tests. In tasks requiring focused attention, S's failure to shut out irrelevant inputs, dimensions, or features can again be assessed either by a reduction in accuracy or by an increased latency of response to the selected stimuli. The accuracy measure will reveal how far S has exclusive access to the relevant stimuli and the latency measure how far he also has direct access to them, assuming they are analyzed serially. However, these measures will only be meaningful in tasks where division of attention is imperfect: if two inputs, dimensions, or targets can be analyzed in parallel with no interference, it is more di‰cult to discover how exclusively Ss can focus at the perceptual level on one of the two. Some possible tests are (a) to use tasks where the two inputs, dimensions, or targets elicit conflicting responses, so that interference at the response level can reveal a failure to focus at the perceptual level; (b) to test incidental perception by asking Ss after the focused attention task what, if anything, they can report about the irrelevant stimuli (Cherry 1953 , Treisman 1965b ; in this case, of course, the results depend not only on Ss' perceiving the irrelevant variables but also on their storing them in memory. The results with divided attention suggest that these indirect tests may only be necessary to investigate selection of analyzers. For input or target-selection, measures of perceptual interference from irrelevant inputs or targets should be su‰cient.
Focused Attention to One Input
In vision di¤erent inputs must inevitably come from di¤erent spatial locations. The most obvious and important method of focusing attention on one input is by peripheral control of the direction of gaze and of the degree of convergence and accommodation. But it may also be possible to demonstrate selectivity at some more central stage in situations where eye movements are excluded. An example of such an experiment is one by Sperling (1960) . He asked Ss to report either a whole display of letters presented tachistoscopically or a subset of these defined immediately after the presentation by their positions in the display (a single row or column). Since the same shape analyzers would be used for many of the letters to be identified, a reduction in the number of items to be analyzed would presumably be beneficial. The Ss in fact reported a much larger proportion of the selected subset than of the total display. Here the selective cue must have a¤ected perceptual analysis rather than the order of report, since a di¤erent cue which itself required analysis of each shape (report of only digits from a display of digits and letters) did not show the same increase in accuracy of report. An experiment by Von Wright (1968) has shown that input-selection may also use other input-defining properties besides spatial position; his Ss showed savings over total report with partial report of letters selected by their color.
Input selection in hearing may be easier to investigate, since peripheral adjustments play a less important role in focusing attention on stimuli from one particular source. Here the e‰ciency with which attention can be focused on one of two or more inputs varies both with the discriminability of the inputs to be selected and rejected, and with the number of inputs to be rejected. When two passages of speech are played separately to the two ears, selection is very e‰cient, as we have seen. There is negligible interference, since Ss can repeat back about as many words correctly as with a single passage after a few trials of practice. When the inputs di¤er in apparent location (separated by di¤erences in the ratio of intensities at the two ears), selection remains e‰cient until the apparent locations are very close together (Treisman 1961) . When the inputs are distinguished only by voice quality, the repeating response is rather less e‰cient (74% correct words compared to 95%; Treisman 1964b), although there are no overt intrusions from the wrong passage. When the two passages di¤er only in average speech rate, e‰ciency is even less (51% correct and 8% intrusions; Treisman 1961). Treisman (1964c) asked Ss always to attend to and repeat back the message reaching the right ear. The irrelevant material in the left ear was then varied in a number of di¤erent ways: (a) the number of irrelevant speech messages; (b) the number of di¤erent dimensions on which the irrelevant messages di¤ered (i.e., spatial locations only or spatial location and voice quality); (c) the di¤erence between the irrelevant messages on one of these dimensions (their apparent spatial separation); (d) the information content and meaningfulness of the words and sentences. She found that the interference varied not with the number of irrelevant messages (word sequences), nor with the number (above one) of dimensions on which they varied, nor with the di‰culty of separating them on one dimension, nor with their verbal content, but rather with the number of di¤erent inputs, distinguished by one or more physical characteristics (location or voice quality).
Another essential requisite for focused attention to one input is, of course, that the analyzer used to distinguish the selected and rejected inputs precede the analyzer for the features controlling the response. For example, it would be impossible to select which sentences to identify on the basis of their meaning, since the meaning could not be known before the sentences had been identified. In other cases the task may not be logically impossible, but may be empirically so. It might be, for example, that spatial position is always identified at some very early stage, so that one cannot select for analysis of their spatial position, a subset of words distinguished by the speaker's voice, the meaning of the words or any other feature that is analyzed more centrally than the spatial position. Or it might in some cases be possible to reverse the order in which the analyzers are arranged to fit the demands of the task; thus, for example, while Ss can select a subset of shapes to identify by their color (identify the red letters and ignore the blue or green), they may also be able to select a subset of colors to identify by their shapes (''what colors are the 'Fs'; ignore the 'Ds' and 'Ys' ''). Preliminary unpublished results by Treisman and Turner suggest that this particular reversal may be possible.
Focused Attention to One Analyzer
The evidence on selection of analyzers so far seems less conclusive. Many of the traditional experiments on selectivity in visual perception (see Egeth 1967 , Haber 1966 come under this heading, since they required attention to be focused on particular dimensions rather than particular sources of stimuli. For example, Ss were told to attend to color and ignore shape, and their accuracy of report was compared when the dimension was specified before and after presentation (Chapman 1932 , Harris and Haber 1963 , Lawrence and LaBerge 1956 . The Ss were usually more accurate on the selected dimension, but these experiments suggested that much, if not all, of the selective e¤ect could be attributed to the order of report or of encoding for memory. For example, Ss did better on the selected dimension only when they verbally described the items dimension by dimension (red, green, square, circle) rather than input by input (red square, green circle). Biederman (1966) gives evidence that irrelevant dimensions are analyzed and cause delays in reaction time. He compared response latencies in a contingent task (where the value of a stimulus on a primary dimension determined which of two secondary dimensions would control the response), a filtering task (where one dimension was always irrelevant), and a condensation task where the values on all three dimensions were relevant to the response. He found that intertrial changes on the irrelevant dimension delayed the response in both filtering and contingent tasks, the delay varying with discriminability. His main aim was to demonstrate that selective and serial processing of di¤erent dimensions is possible, and he argues that this is demonstrated by the facts that (a) reaction time was faster in the contingent than the condensation task, (b) intertrial repetitions and discriminability both had more e¤ect when they involved the primary dimension than the secondary, and (c) errors were more frequent on the secondary dimension. Some of these findings, however, could also be explained on the assumption that all dimensions were analyzed in parallel, but the response was initiated as soon as the relevant information had been obtained. Then the slowest dimension (the least discriminable) would determine reaction times only when it was relevant to the tasks in the contingent condition, but would always be completed for the condensation task.
A task in which Ss clearly fail to reject an irrelevant analyzer is the Stroop test mentioned earlier, in which they are asked to name the colors of printed words which themselves name other colors (Stroop 1935) . The irrelevant printed names interfere considerably with the color-naming task. Another is an experiment by Montague (1965) in which variations on a dimension which was sometimes relevant to responses interfered more with the identification of multidimensional sounds than variations on a dimension which was always irrelevant. A failure to select between more complex groups of higher level analyzers was found by Treisman (1964b) . Two competing messages were spoken in the same voice, intensity, and position, but in di¤er-ent languages, to see how far selection could take the form of focusing on the analyzers for a particular language. If a bilingual S could refrain from ''asking questions'' which would lead him to identify French words when his task was to repeat back the English, he should do better with the irrelevant message in French than in English. This did not appear to be the case: An irrelevant message in a known foreign language caused as much interference with the relevant English as another English passage, di¤erentiated only by its subject matter, while an unknown foreign language (for which no analyzer was available to S) caused appreciably less interference.
These findings suggest that focusing on particular perceptual analyzers while excluding others may be di‰cult or impossible. It certainly appears to be less e‰cient than focusing on a selected input. Can one explain the marked interference in these focused attention tasks without casting doubt on the earlier conclusion that divided attention to di¤erent analyzers was relatively e‰cient? There are two possible sources of interference other than a direct perceptual limit on the number of analyzers which can operate simultaneously: (a) Interference may arise at the response level when the outputs of two analyzers evoke conflicting responses. Using the Stroop test, for example, Klein (1964) found that Ss did better if they were allowed first to read the words and suggested that allowing Ss first to ''unload'' the competing response facilitated their performance on the color-naming task. Another test would be to see if one could reduce the interference by using a nonverbal response, which should conflict less with the irrelevant but dominant reading response.
(b) Irrelevant analyzers may indirectly produce perceptual as well as response interference by e¤ectively increasing the number of irrelevant inputs to be rejected. If the use of certain analyzers is obligatory, Ss may be forced to distinguish irrelevant sets of incoming data, so producing two or more irrelevant inputs to later analyzers instead of one. The experiment described earlier by Treisman (1964c) gives an example of this: Two irrelevant messages in di¤erent voices or di¤erent positions interfered more with attention to a third than two irrelevant messages which did not di¤er in voice quality or position. If Ss had been able, for example, to ''switch out'' the analyzers distinguishing the man's from the woman's voice, the two irrelevant messages which di¤ered only in voice quality (like the two irrelevant messages in the same voice) would have acted as a single competing input to the speech analyzers instead of as two competing inputs.
Focused Attention to One Target
The ability to select voluntarily a single target or subset of features to look for is demonstrated by the same experiments which were used as evidence of serial rather than parallel processing in divided attention. If Ss were unable to set themselves for particular targets in a search task, the number of relevant targets should have no e¤ect on search time. Since such an e¤ect has been clearly demonstrated, for example, by Sternberg (1966) and by Kaplan et al. (1966) , we must conclude that Ss can restrict their analysis to features relevant to the task. The ability to do this often improves considerably with practice, provided that the target chosen makes it possible potentially to select a subset of tests for critical features (Rabbitt 1964) . Tweedy 1964, LaBerge et al. 1967) showed similar selective e¤ects on response latency with simpler targets defined as single values on a dimension-red versus other colors, for example. With ambiguous figures, however, and in binocular rivalry, the selection does not appear to be under direct voluntary control, although it may be influenced indirectly by expectancy or motivation (e.g., Engel 1956, Schafer and Murphy 1943) .
Conclusions
These findings suggest that division of attention between two or more inputs and between two or more targets is di‰cult or impossible, when no time is allowed for alternating attention or serial analysis, and that selective focusing is both e‰-cient and frequently used with inputs reaching a single analyzer from di¤erent physical sources or with target items identified by the same analyzer or by overlapping groups of shared analyzers. However, the experiments requiring attention to di¤erent dimensions are less conclusive, partly because experiments testing focused attention have often assumed that divided attention is impossible and looked for perceptual interference from irrelevant analyzers, while experiments testing divided attention have often assumed that focused attention is possible and measured decrements with divided attention. The evidence on the whole suggests that focusing on a particular dimension is di‰cult, at least when it involves selecting one of two independent aspects of a single set of stimuli (i.e., when it cannot be combined with input-selective attention), while division of attention between analyzers is relatively e‰cient at least compared to division of attention between inputs. There may be some degree of perceptual interference, particularly when discriminability is poor and Ss are asked to make judgments of near threshold variations on two dimensions at once (see Lindsay, in press), but most decrements with two compared to one analyzer can be attributed to response interference or indirectly to an increase in the number of inputs.
Why then should focusing on a particular analyzer be more di‰cult than focusing on one input or one target? It is not simply that certain analyzers are located very peripherally in the nervous system (e.g., the three types of color receptors in the retina) and so are less subject to central control, since the failure to select can also occur between more central groups of analyzers like those for di¤erent languages. Analyzer selection is probably less practiced than input or target selection, since far fewer tasks require selective attention to single dimensions. But there may be a more fundamental reason: It may be that the nervous system is forced to use whatever discriminative systems it has available, unless these are already fully occupied with other tests or inputs, so that we tend to use our perceptual capacity to the full on whatever sense data reach the receptors. If we are correct in assuming the existence of independent analyzers, it would then follow that all dimensions of a stimulus input would be analyzed unless the analyzers were already engaged on some other input.
These conclusions and suggestions are of course very tentative. They may well be refuted by future results, or by existing data of which the author is not aware. The main object of this paper was to raise questions rather than propose answers. This brief general review has shown how many problems remain and how scanty is the evidence so far available. Words like ''attention,'' ''stimulus,'' or ''input'' have been used to cover a variety of logically di¤erent concepts. Clarifying these may help to explain the conflicting experimental results and to throw light on the underlying mechanisms. Even in these general terms the processes are very incompletely described. For example, little has been said about how the outputs of two analyzers are related when they refer to a single external source. Does mismatching sometimes occur in selective attention, so that, for example, a particular word may be heard or remembered in the wrong voice or position? The model might predict this type of error and subjectively one does sometimes experience it.
Another unanswered question is what the actual mechanisms of selection are for each type of attention. In selection of inputs is some positive blocking or reduction is signalto-noise ratio of rejected sensory data necessary, or can one choose simply not to analyze them further? Some discussion and evidence on this point are given by Treisman (1964a Treisman ( , 1965b , by Broadbent and Gregory (1963) , and by Lindsay (1967 Lindsay ( , 1968 . Similarly, in target selection and analyzer selection (if this occurs) does attention simply determine in an all-or-nothing fashion which features or dimensions are analyzed and which are not, or does it vary the decision criteria and/or the fineness of discrimination adopted in analyzing particular features or dimensions, or is there some positive blocking or reduction in signal-to-noise ratio of all sensory inputs reaching irrelevant test points or analyzers? It is possible that the three types of perceptual attention work through the same underlying mechanism and di¤er only in the range either of data or of tests to which they apply it. Current and future research may help to answer some of these questions.
